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2Targeted Strategic Trade Policy With
Domestic Cost  Heterogeneity
1. Introduction
Even a casual observation of the real world suggests that firms within the same industry
differ in their market shares and performance.   Economic theory has often assumed these
differences to be temporary, and that they would be eliminated by a natural process of diffusion
of organisational practices and technical knowledge.  This conclusion, however, is at odds with
the evidence emerging from empirical studies which suggests a long-run persistence of inter-firm
differences in size and performance within a given industry1.  
Only recently has theoretical work started to investigate how differences in firms’
performance can be sustained over time and are not eliminated by entry and/or exit. In models
set in the evolutionary tradition history plays a decisive role in shaping and maintaining
differences in  efficiency and performance between firms. Within this framework, Rosenberg
(1982), Nelson and Winter (1982) and Dosi (1988) argue that technology, defined in a broad
sense and seen as being embodied in people and organisations, reflects specific and only partially
appropriable cumulative knowledge.  The role of history is also crucial in models set in a more
orthodox framework,  where rational firms are subject to random shocks to technology as in
Jovanovic (1982) or to demand as in Fishman and Rob (1995).  In Kreps and Spence (1985)
firm-specific strategies and performances result from the different conjectures firms make about
their competitors’ behaviour.  Demsetz (1973) ascribes the existence of persistent technological
differences between firms to the fact that competitors may lack the knowledge to imitate the
technology of the most successful firms.   Lippman and Rumelt (1982) show,  within a perfectly
competitive framework, how uncertainty as to firms’ efficiency prior to entry can lead to
persistent inter-firm differences in profitability.
                    
   
1
 Mueller (1986) found persistent long-run profitability differences amongst US firm
within industries. Cubbin and Geroski (1987) and Mueller (1990) confirmed these findings
for the U.K.. See also Clark and Fujimono (1991) for evidence on the auto industry.
3These contributions in the recent industrial organisation literature are concerned with the
sources of the persistent nature of differences between firms.  When used in other areas of the
theoretical literature, however, imperfectly competitive market structures are normally
characterised by the assumption of firms’ homogeneity2.  The literature on strategic trade policy
and international trade under oligopoly is no exception to this general pattern and until now  it
has almost always assumed that all firms in a particular country are identical3.
In this paper, we construct a model which extends the work of Dixit (1984), Markusen
and Venables (1988), Collie (1991) and Thursby and Krishna (1991) on many firms oligopoly
trade models. All these previous authors imposed symmetry among firms within countries. 
Instead, we  examine trade policy for oligopolistic industries where firms are characterised by
different marginal costs.
Cost asymmetries among firms have been introduced by Collie (1993, 1998), Lahiri and
Ono (1995), and Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) who assume that national industries are made
up of heterogeneous firms. However, Lahiri and Ono (1995) do not carry out a full trade policy
analysis and Collie (1993) and Long and Soubeyran (1997), though they examine strategic trade
issues,  do not analyse the first-best policy4, which we will show consists of a vector of firm
specific subsidies.  In fact,  only when firms have identical marginal costs can the first-best be
achieved with a uniform subsidy. The drawbacks of uniform subsidisation only become an issue
when firms differ in terms of their efficiency. In that case the government can do better by using
                    
    
2
 For a closed economy analysis of oligopoly with heterogeneous firms see Cowling and
Waterson (1976), Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Kimmel (1992). Montagna (1995) examines firm
heterogeneity in a monopolistic competition model.
    
3
 See Brander (1995) for a recent survey of the literature on strategic trade policy.
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 Lahiri and Ono (1995) restrict attention to normative consequences of the exiting of a minor
(high cost) firm from the market. They find that this always benefits a country if the country is
an exporter of the good produced by this firm. Collie (1998) analyses the welfare effects and
compares the efficiency of uniform ad valorem and specific (per-unit) trade policy instruments.
He finds that while an ad valorem production subsidy yields lower welfare than a per-unit
production subsidy, combining uniform ad valorem and per-unit  instruments yields welfare
gains.
4a structure of firm-specific subsidies. A similar distinction between firm-specific and uniform
subsidies is made by Rodrik (1989). However, he compares optimal firm-specific and uniform
taxes in a model where there are no foreign competitors and hence no strategic trade
considerations arise.
The acknowledgement of inter-firm differences raises important questions in the field of
 trade policy.   The strategic trade policy literature suggests that an active intervention may be
desirable if domestic firms’ profits can be increased at the expense of foreign competitors.
Recently, Neary (1994) considers an international duopoly and argues that if there exist inter-
country differences in marginal costs, government assistance should be targeted towards those
industries which have a “comparative advantage in profit shifting”; in other words,  policy
should favour those domestic industries in which firms have a cost advantage over their foreign
rivals5.
Neary, however does not address the important issue of the nature of an optimal
intervention in cases where differences in efficiency exist between domestic firms within
industries. Should the government reduce firm heterogeneity in the industry by helping the
weaker more than the stronger firms? Or should it pursue the opposite policy of picking-
winners? The purpose of this paper is to examine these issues. We find, somewhat surprisingly
that the picking of winners results will be reversed at moderately high social costs of funds.
In the strategic trade policy literature it is generally assumed that the social cost of public
funds is unity. That is, equal weight is placed on government subsidy expenditure and the
domestic private profits generated by the home firms. However, as has recently been pointed out
by Gruenspecht (1988) and Neary (1994), there are several reasons for regarding this as a rather
special case. First, a cost is incurred by society in the process of transferring purchasing power
from the taxpayers to the government. Several components of this cost can be identified, such as
deadweight losses caused by taxpayers activities aimed at reducing the tax burden, and the
administrative costs associated with the managing of the tax administration. Second, political
economy and distributional considerations may also imply that profits are attached a lower social
value than the other incomes taxed to finance the subsidy bill. Third, if the firms are partially
                    
  
5
 Within a similar framework, Bandyopadhyay (1997) analyses the interaction of international
cost asymmetries and demand elasticities in determining the direction of strategic trade policy.
5foreign owned, not all the profits will accrue to domestic residents. To take account of these
factors, in this paper we allow for an asymmetry between private and social costs and we show
how the nature of the optimal policy in general and the radicality of the pick-the-winner
prescription in particular are affected.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The strategic trade
policy analysis is carried out in Section 3 where the effect of the asymmetry between social and
private costs is analysed. Section 4 draws some conclusions and charts future directions in
research.
2. The Model
We consider a model in which n home firms and n* foreign firms export a homogeneous
commodity to a third market. The inverse demand function which is twice differentiable is:
where Q is total industry sales.  Firms have different but constant marginal costs represented by
ic for a typical home firm and  ck*  for a typical foreign firm. Profits for a typical home firm from
exports to the third market are:
where  is a firm-specific export subsidy and iq  is the quantity produced by firm i.  We follow
Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) in restricting attention to
competition on the export market and assume no links with any other market, in order to
concentrate on strategic trade policy issues and abstract from the welfare implications of
domestic consumption. Entry and exit of firms are ruled out by assumption and fixed costs
(which may account for the oligopolistic structure) are ignored as they play no role in the
p(Q),      p (Q) =  - b(Q) <  0′ (1)
i i i i =  (p - c +s ) q ,π (2)
6analysis when there is a fixed number of firms6. We consider the case in which only the home
government is policy active so that the profits of a typical foreign firm from exporting to the
third market are:
Home country welfare from exports to the third market depends positively on profits
and negatively on the subsidy payments. It is usually assumed in the literature that profits and
government revenue have equal weight in the welfare function. There are several reasons for
regarding this as a rather special case. For example, distributional considerations may imply that
the incomes taxed to finance the subsidy payments may be attached a higher social value than
profits. Also, the government may face a revenue constraint or may not be able to finance the
subsidy bill by non-distortionary lump-sum taxation, and will incur administrative costs in
managing the tax system. With international capital mobility, foreign ownership may imply that a
portion of domestically generated profit is repatriated. In this case, the social cost of funds will
clearly be inversely related to the domestically held equity share. Taking some or all of these
considerations into account has important, and to an extent separate, consequences. First, as the
social cost of funds increases the profit-shifting argument is weakened, given that the
government is not prepared to trade off one extra dollar earned in profit with one extra dollar in
subsidy payments.  Second, the nature of the optimal discriminatory policy is likely to be
affected by the extent of the difference between social and private cost of funds. It is therefore
likely that the firm-specific optimal policy in our model may be sensitive to the social cost of
funds7. To examine this issue we follow Neary (1994) and introduce a parameter  δ≥1 to
measure the social cost of funds. The welfare function will then be written as:
                    
   
6
 Although we do not model entry and exit of firms, in some equilibria not all the firms
will be exporting.   In that case, firms may also be selling on the home market and/or on
other markets.
  
7
 Clarke (1988) examines a closed economy asymmetric Cournot model in which the
government seeks to maximise tax revenue at given industry price levels. He finds that it is
optimal to tax the more efficient firms more than the less efficient ones.
k
*
k
*
k
*
 =  (p - c )q .π (3)
7{ }W s q p c s qi i i i i
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= − = − + −∑∑∑π δ δ( )1 .                                                              (4)
This game has two stages and the equilibrium is subgame perfect. The government
chooses its subsidies in stage 1 and firms compete in a Cournot manner choosing their output in
stage 2. The first-order condition for a typical home firm is:
and the first-order condition for a typical foreign firm is:
Note, these first-order conditions imply that the market share of a firm with a low marginal cost
net of subsidies is higher than the market share of a firm with a high marginal cost net of
subsidies8.
As in Brander and Spencer (1985) and most of the strategic trade literature, we will
assume that quantities are strategic substitutes9.
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 To see this make use of (5) or (6) to obtain: j j =  p -p ,α ε
µ



where   is the market share of the jth firm,  ε = p/bQ is the elasticity of demand and   is
marginal cost net of subsidies for firm j.
    
9
 The concept of strategic substitutes is due to Bulow et al (1985). The assumption that all
quantities are strategic substitutes implies that the marginal profit of any firm is falling in the
output of any other firm:  . Strategic substitutability is referred to in Dixit (1986) as the "normal"
case under Cournot competition.
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8Assumption 1:  Outputs are strategic substitutes for all firms: 
0r1 L >+α , where r(Q)=b’Q/b and  Lα  is the market share of the largest firm
in the industry.
This is also the Hahn (1962) sufficient condition for stability of a Cournot equilibrium. Demand
is concave if r(Q), the elasticity of the slope, is positive. Assumption 1 thus implies a restriction
on the convexity of demand (i.e. r(Q) cannot be too negative)10.
For later reference, we need to derive the comparative-static properties of the output
game. The effects of the subsidies on total industry output is obtained by totally differentiating
(5) and (6) and adding up the resulting n+n* equations. The resulting expression is:
Using (7) in the total derivative of (5) gives the comparative-static properties of an individual
home firm’s output. This is represented by:
b dq n n r ds r dsi i i i j
j i
n
∆ = + + − − +
≠
∑[ ( ) ] ( )* 1 1α α  ,                                                            (8)
where   is the market share of the ith home firm.  From (8) it is then possible to obtain the
following expression for the change in total home output:
b dq D dsi i
i
n
i
n
∆ = ∑∑ .                                                                                                                (9)
                    
  
10
 If  demand is convex,  i.e.  r<0, Assumption 1 implies (1+ Lα r) ≤{1+[1/(n+n*)]r}
since  Lα  ≥ 1/(n+n*).  Therefore, it must be the case that (n+n*+r)>0.
b dQ =  d s  
 
where:     (n+n +1+r) >  0.
i
*
∆
∆
∑
≡
(7)
9where D n ri
i
n
≡ + + −∑1 1* ( )α  is positive from Assumption 111. This implies that an increase in
any or all of the subsidies will lead to an increase in total home exports. It is also straightforward
to show that an increase in any or all of the  subsidies will lead to a fall in all of the foreign
outputs.
3. Optimal Strategic Export Subsidies
3.1.   The First-Best
We first consider the first-best policy which involves firm-specific subsidies. The home
government has n subsidy instruments and n targets in the form of exports for each of the home
firms.   We model the home government as choosing the optimal levels of exports of each of the
home firms taking account of the reactions of foreign exports.  Totally differentiate (4) to get:
{ }dW p c s dq b q dQ q dsi i i i i i
i
n
i
n
i
n
= − + − − + − ∑∑∑ ( ) ( )1 1δ δ .                                        (10)
Make use of (5), the typical home firm’s first-order condition, and the total derivative of (5) in
(10) to get the following expression for a typical home subsidy:
s bq b q r dQ
dqi
o
i i i
ii
n
=
−
− +
− ∑2 1 1δδ
δ
δ α
.                                                                        (11)
which can be rewritten in terms of the average subsidy.  Sum over the n subsidies and substitute
into (11) to get:
s
n
s
n
c ci
o
i
o
i
n
i i
i
n
= +
−
−
−



∑ ∑
1 2
2 1
1δ
δ( )
.                                                                                 (12)
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 To see that D is positive,  sum the inequalities 1 0+ >α k r*   across all foreign firms to get:
 n ri
i
n
* + −



 >∑1 0α   where  α αk ii
n
k
n
*
*
= −∑∑ 1  is the foreign country’s market share.
10
The first term on the right-hand side represents the average subsidy level, and the second term
gives the deviation of any particular subsidy from this average level. The deviation of a typical
firm i’s subsidy  from the average subsidy depends on (i) its cost relative to the cost of the
average firm in the industry and (ii) the size of the social cost of fund parameter. In particular,
let firm i be more efficient than the average home firm, i.e. c
n
ci j
j
n
< ∑1 . Then firm i will receive
a subsidy which is higher than the average industry subsidy, i.e. s
n
si
o
j
o
j
n
> ∑1 , if and only if  δ<2.
Thus,
Proposition 1:  The home government optimal firm specific policy entails a structure of
subsidies. Lower cost firms will receive higher export subsidies only if the
social cost of funds is sufficiently low.
Hence, the optimal policy implies a structure of firm-specific subsidies. A uniform policy is
optimal in the unlikely event of all firms having identical marginal costs. As in Neary (1994),  for
sufficiently low levels of δ, the policy prescription is one of picking winners.  In Neary (1994),
however, the policy implication is that the government should favour winning industries. Our
analysis suggests that the government should select winning firms within industries. Neary’s
argument adds strength to the view that there are sectors in the economy that are more valuable
than others.   Our result goes further and points at the existence of a comparative advantage in
profit-shifting within industries and at the firm level.   This comparative advantage in profit
shifting, however, should only be exploited if the social opportunity cost of the subsidy bill is not
too high. This conclusion adds complexity to the profit shifting argument for an active trade
policy.  One of the criticisms levelled against strategic trade policy concerns the ability of the
government to identify the strategic sectors.  The need to be able to identify the winning firms
within an industry may be seen as casting further doubts on the feasibility of  implementing 
strategic trade policies.
11
 A second policy implication of Proposition 1 is that the nature of the discriminatory
policy will depend on the difference between private and social cost of funds. A pick-the-
winners strategy will be optimal only if the social cost of public funds is not too high. Note that
the average subsidy in equation (12) can be positive or negative. If the optimal average subsidy
is negative (i.e. it is a tax), more efficient firms will be taxed less than the average firm provided
that δ<2. Thus, when the social cost of funds is sufficiently low, the pick-the-winners policy
result holds regardless of whether the optimal policy consists of a structure of subsidies or taxes
(or a combination of both). It follows, that if the social cost of funds is sufficiently high,
relatively more efficient firms should be more highly taxed/less subsidised12. Summing equation
(12) over the domestic firms and dividing by n yields the average subsidy:
s
b
n
q b q r
D
o
i i i
i
n
i
n
=
−
− +
−∑∑2 1 1 1δδ
δ
δ α( )
                                                                    (13)
For δ≥2,  s o   is negative. This implies the following:
Corollary 1:    δ>2 is a necessary condition for the pick-the-winners policy to be reversed and  
δ≥2 is a sufficient condition for the average subsidy to be a tax.
Proof: the first part follows from (12) and the second part is proved in appendix A.2.
Note that (12) and (13) coincide for  δ=2:
s s
b q r
D
o
i
o
i i
i
n
= = −
+∑ ( )2
2
α
                                                                                                  (14)
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 It is easy to show that when subsidies are chosen optimally, there is an inverse
relationship between firms’ marginal production costs and equilibrium output levels for all
values of the social cost of funds. Therefore, the ranking of home firms’ outputs is not
affected by the “pick-the-winners policy reversal”.
12
That is, at the threshold level of the social cost of funds at which the pick-the-winners policy is
reversed, every firm receives the negative subsidy:
Corollary 2: At δ=2 the first-best policy entails a uniform tax.
Hence, the picking-the-winners policy is weakened as δ increases and is reversed at high values
of the social cost of funds. The intuition for this result is that the higher the level of  δ the higher
will be the social opportunity cost of the subsidy bill.  When δ exceeds unity the government is
directly concerned to minimise total subsidy payments. Low cost firms, as well as having a
comparative advantage in rent-shifting, have larger market shares and hence for given per-unit
subsidies contribute more to raising the government’s total subsidy bill. At sufficiently high
levels of  δ,  the opportunity cost of the subsidy bill dominates the rent-shifting motive and the
picking winners policy is reversed.
An interesting issue concerns the size of the social opportunity cost of funds. The
empirical literature on the marginal cost of public funds offers a substantial amount of estimates.
Although these vary quite widely, the majority of studies suggests that δ may lie between 1.25
and 1.5013.  Thus, this evidence seems to support the pick-the-winners policy.
3.2.  A Special Case: No-Social Cost of Funds
An interesting special case is that in which  there is no social opportunity cost of public
funds. From (5) it is obvious that for δ=1, there does not exist a first-best interior solution when
firms have different marginal costs. Instead we obtain a corner solution. Thus, if the exports of
firm i are positive when optimally chosen, then there can be no home firm with a marginal cost
higher than that of firm i exporting a positive output.  To set qj at zero the government must set
a firm-specific tax (negative subsidy):
                    
    
13
  Carmichael (1991) obtains an estimate of 1.34; Fullerton (1991) finds 1<δ<1.25
while Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) find a range between 1.15 and 1.50.
j js   - (p - c )≤ . (15)
13
Only the lowest cost firm receives a subsidy that allows it to produce a positive output. The
optimal export subsidy for the lowest cost firm is obtained by combining (5), (10), the
expression for dQ/dqi in (a.2) and the derivative of the foreign reaction function in (a.4). The
resulting formula is:
where the subscript i has been dropped as there is only one home firm active on the market. This
is the optimal firm-specific export subsidy for the lowest cost home firm when the social cost of
funds is unity14.
Proposition 2: The home government’s optimal firm-specific policy when the social cost of
funds is unity is a positive subsidy to the lowest cost firm and a negative
subsidy to all other home firms so as to set their exports at zero.
Thus, even in the special case in which δ=1 the optimal export subsidy policy implies a structure
of firm-specific subsidies. In this case, however, the pick-the-winner policy prescription is much
stronger. Far from trying to reduce the degree of heterogeneity by helping the weaker more than
the stronger firms, the government should always support the strongest firm and set  all the
other home firms’ exports at zero, regardless of the number and size of domestic firms. This
result is sensitive to our constant marginal cost assumption15.
                                                             
    
14
 Of course if two firms have the same marginal cost they may both be subsidized. If so, they
will receive identical subsidies. Suppose there are m ≤n firms that all have equal costs and these
are lower than those of any other home firm then the optimal subsidy to each of these firms is:
s bq m dq
dq
mi i
k
ik
n
= − + −

∑
**
( )1 .
  
15
 It seems particularly implausible that marginal costs will remain constant if the initial market
share of the chosen firm is small (i.e. if n is initially large). Clearly, in such a case it is unlikely
that the firm will be able to increase its output by the required amount without experiencing
capacity constraints or increasing marginal costs. The implications of increasing marginal costs
are discussed in Leahy and Montagna (1997).
o
*
*
s  =  bq n
+(1- )r
n +1+(1- )r
 >  0α
α
(16)
14
3.3.  The Second-Best
The first-best firm-specific export subsidy policy may not always be a viable option for
the government.  A major problem certainly lies in the greater informational requirement of the
optimal discriminatory policy.  Political economy considerations may also mean that the
government will not want to favour one producer over another.  It is therefore possible to
envisage circumstances in which the government is constrained to set a uniform export subsidy
for all home firms.  Collie (1993) and Von Long and Soubeyran (1997) examine the effect on
welfare of a small increase in the uniform subsidy starting at zero16. We now generalise their
analysis by deriving the optimal uniform subsidy for cases in which the social cost of funds is
greater than unity. 
From equation (4) the first-order condition for welfare maximisation is:
Make use of (5), (7) and (8) in (17) to give the optimal uniform subsidy:
In general, the sign of the optimal uniform subsidy depends on that of the numerator of
equation (18) (since the denominator is positive). In the special case in which all the firms within
a particular country have equal marginal costs and the social cost of funds is equal to unity, the
sign of the optimal subsidy depends only on the relative number of home and foreign firms and
on the convexity of demand17. The reason why n>1 domestic firms works towards an export tax
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 Von Long and Soubeyran (1997) also consider the optimal export tax (or subsidy).
17
 This was shown by Dixit (1984) and Krishna and Thursby (1991).
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15
is now well known. When there are more than one home firm these firms do not fully internalise
the effects of their output decision on the export price faced by other home firms. In the general
demand case, the curvature of the demand function also has a role in  affecting the optimal
subsidy. In the symmetric firm case with general demands, convex demand makes it more likely
that the optimal policy is a tax and concave demand makes it more likely that it is a subsidy.  
When firms are heterogeneous other considerations arise. With δ=1, it remains the case that if
demand is linear the optimal subsidy depends on the relative number of firms. However, if
demand is very concave, it is possible for the optimal uniform subsidy to be negative even if n* is
larger than n. As has recently been shown18, heterogeneity of firms works against a positive
optimal subsidy when demand is concave (r>0).  This is because in this case a uniform increase
in the subsidy raises the output of smaller firms more than that of larger ones, and an increased
subsidy can actually reduce the output of some of the most efficient domestic firms.   This
implication of the analysis may be particularly important if learning-by-doing or consumer
switching cost dynamics are present.  As already discussed, a non-discriminatory policy would
not allow the exploitation of firms’ comparative advantage in profit-shifting. The degree of “sub-
optimality” of a uniform subsidy may then be higher if (when past output levels are important)
less efficient firms see their market share increase at the expense of more efficient competitors. 
The introduction of the social cost of funds introduces new considerations. A higher
social cost of funds makes a tax more desirable. To be more precise, the uniform subsidy is non-
negative if  δ δ<  where:
δ
α
α
=
+ +
−
∑
∑
2 1
2
( )*n r n rii
n
i
i
n∆ ∆
                                                                                               (19)
Proposition 3: The optimal uniform subsidy is positive if and only if  δ is smaller than δ  which
is itself less than two.
                    
18
 Similar results are obtained by Collie (1993), Leahy and Montagna (1997) and Van Long
and Soubeyran (1997).
16
See Appendix A.3. for a proof that δ < 2 .  In the linear case this threshold is
δ = +
+ +
2 1
1
( )*
*
n
n n
which is less than two, decreasing in n and increasing in n*.
Furthermore, as was shown in Corollary 2,  for general demand at δ=2 the uniform
coincides with the average subsidy and is first-best. In the latter case, the uniform/average
subsidy is negative. Also, from equation (13) and (18) it can be shown that for linear demand
(i.e. r=0) the uniform subsidy equals the average firm-specific subsidy.
4.  Concluding Remarks
In the literature on strategic trade policy and international trade under oligopoly it has
usually been assumed that all firms in a particular country are identical.  An innovation of this
paper is to examine the first-best optimal strategic trade policy under oligopoly when firms have
different levels of efficiency.  In filling this gap in the literature, we have shown that the first-best
policy involves a structure of firm-specific subsidies and taxes in which, unless the social cost of
funds is high, the government favours the most efficient home firms. A consequence of this is
that the uniform export subsidy is typically suboptimal.
In a context characterised by heterogeneous technologies, the government may be
tempted to subsidise weaker firms, thus reducing the domestic industry’s mean marginal cost of
exports.   This policy would effectively lead to a reduction in the variability of the home
exporters’ costs.  Our analysis suggests that the nature of the optimal policy crucially depends
on the social opportunity cost of public funds. If the social cost of funds is sufficiently low, the
government should favour more efficient firms. The picking-the-winners policy was shown to be
more radical the larger are the cost differences between firms.
Clearly, these conclusions add complexity to the area of strategic trade policy.  The need
to identify the winning firms within an industry may be seen as casting further doubts on the
feasibility of  implementing  strategic trade policies. 
Much work remains to be done in the area of trade policy under oligopoly with
heterogeneous firms. In this paper we have restricted attention to competition on a third market.
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Competition on the home market and issues of intermarket spillovers need to be addressed. 
Throughout we have assumed that the number of firms is constant.  In standard models,
allowing for free-entry leads to the elimination of supernormal profits. When firms are
heterogeneous, however, free-entry would only eliminate profits for marginal firms and the
profit-shifting rationale for trade policy may not disappear.   Finally, this paper rules out the
existence of asymmetric information. A natural extension of the model would be to assume that
the government does not have perfect information about firms’ costs and lacks therefore the
ability to pick winners. In future work we would like to address some of these issues. 
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Appendix
A.1.  The foreign reaction function
When the government is carrying out the optimal firm-specific policy it effectively
chooses the vector of home exports before the foreigners choose their outputs. To examine the
reaction of foreign output to a change in home output totally differentiate the first-order
condition of a typical foreign firm given in (6) to get:
The total change in output as a result of a change in iq  taking account of the foreign reaction is:
Combine (a.1) and (a.2) to get:
dQ
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n r
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k
k
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+ +
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∑
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1
0
* *
*
α
                                                                                                  (a.3)
It is then possible to use (a.3) in (a.1) to obtain:
k
*
k
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 =  - (1+ r)dQα (a.1)
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A.2. Proof of  Corollary 1
Let φ=δ -2  and rewrite equation (13) as:
s
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( ) ( )
2
2 1
2
1
                                            (a.5)
For φ≥0 (which implies δ≥2) this is negative: the first term is non-positive and the second term is
unambiguously negative from Assumption 1. QED.
A.3. Proposition 3: proof that δ < 2
Let φ=δ -2 and rewrite equation (18) as:
s
b
n
q n r
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i
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= −
+ +
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( )2 α φ
δ
∆
                                                                                       (a.6)
From the firms’ second order conditions all the (2+ iα r) terms are positive. Hence for φ≥0 (i.e. 
δ≥2), (a.6) is unambiguously negative. QED.
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